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NOTES AND COMMENTS
lative history and saw that the former interpretation had been pre-
sented to Congress in a precise form.29 The minority would place
the burden of proof upon those who are attempting to show that Con-
gress did not intend to adopt existing interpretations. Statutory inter-
pretation should be on the basis of the assumed acquiescence of the
members of the legislature to the prevailing interpretations.30 Grant-
ing that the Court in the first instance misinterpreted the Act of
1906, there has been abundant opportunity for Congress to give fur-
ther expression to their will.3 ' Its failure to do so amounts to ratifi-
cation.s2 Congress having adopted the statute by reenactment, neither
the department charged with its execution nor the courts should be
at liberty to disregard it.33 This properly places the responsibility of
settling controversial issues of interpretation on the legislature and
relegates the judicial function to that of making a determinable
statute somewhat more determinate8 4
SUPREME COURT
SELECTION FEDERAL JURY PANEL
Petitioner was injured when he jumped from moving train operated
by respondent. Suit in a California court alleging negligence, was
removed to federal court in San Francisco where petitioner moved to
strike jury panel as it represented "mostly business executives or those
having the employer's point of view. . ." Evidence showed the jury
commissioners excluded day laborers from the jury list since this group
probably would have been excused by the trial judge anyway on
grounds of financial hardship. Motion denied. Court of appeals
29. See n. 10 supra.
30. U.S. v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926). See U.S. v. SouthEastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (Dissenting opinion by
Stone, C.J.).
31. See n. 10 supra.
32. Manley v. Mayor, 68 Kan. 377, 75 Pac. 550 (1904); U.S. v. Elgin
J. & E. Ry., 298 U.S. 492 (1935). Contra: Rosse v. St. Paul
& D. Ry., 68 Minn. 216, 71 N.W. 20 (1897). See Sutherland,
"Statutory Construction" (3d ed. 1943) § 5109.
33. See Sutherland, "Statutory Construction" (3d ed. 1943) § 5109.
For a discussion of this problem in the field of tax and admin-
istrative law, see Alford, "Treasury Regulations with the Wilshire
Oil Case" (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 252; Brown, "Regulations, Re-
enactment, and the Revenue Acts" (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 377;
Feller, "Addendum to the Regulations Problem" (1941) 54 Harv.
L. Rev. 1311; Griswold, "A Summary of the Regulations Prob-
lem" (1941) 54 Harv. L. R. 398; Paul, "Use and Abuse of Tax
Regulations in Statutory Construction" (1940) 49 Yale L. J.
660; Surrey, "The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations
under the Income, Estate and Gift Taxes" (1940) 88 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 556; "If there has been a series of uniform decisions on
the same point they ought to have the force of law, because in
this case they become conclusive evidence of the law. . . " Lieber,
"Hermeneuties" (3d ed. 1880).
34. Radin, "Statutory Interpretation" (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863.
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affirmed.' Certiorari granted. Held, reversed. The court, through Mr.
Justice Murphy stated, inter alia, that "such exclusion cannot be justi-
fied by state or federal law." Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 66 S. Ct.
984 (1946).2
Jurors in federal courts are qualified according to the law of the
state in which the court is sitting.3 The state may provide quaifica-
tions and exemptions so long as it doesn't discriminate against persons
because of their race, color, or previous condition of servitude.4 The
California code makes provision for specific exemptions in the interests
of the community,5 but there are no provisions for exemption of day
laborers as such. Yet, it further provides that the jury lists shall
be made of such only as are not exempt and who are otherwise quali-
fied.6 Still, the California code provides that prospective jurors may
be excused by the court for other than trivial reasons, when material
injury or destruction to that person's property is threatened.7 Thus
the court was faced with an exemption of a particular class not spe-
cifically provided for by the California code. The proposition is now
apparent that this is a violation of federal law by reference to the
state law.
But the court went further than the above proposition by stating
that this was also violative of the American tradition of trial by jury.
The courts conception of this jury, by analogy to the cases arising
under the Fourteenth Amendment, is that it be a body truly repre-
sentative of the community and be drawn from a cross-section thereof.8
Yet, an arbitrary exclusion of members of a particular race is a denial
of equal protection of the laws.9 Even though the cases in the past
have confined themselves to the issue of racial discrimination,1 it
is apparent that the court is extending the principle of those cases
to cover the circumstance here.
Since the United States Supreme Court exercises supervisory
powers over the lower federal courts, it may reverse a judgement
when something less than a constitutional issue is involved." The court
condemned the practice of the jury commissioners as not only viola-
1. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 149 F. (2d) 783 (C.C.A. 9th, 1945).
2. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with whom Mr. Justice Reed concurred,
dissented.
3. 28 U.S.C.A. (1942) § 411.
4. Id. § 411 (8).
5. Calif. Code of Civ. Proc. (1941) §§ 198-200.
6. Id. § 205.
7. Id. § 201.
8. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); accord, Dixon v. State,
67 N.E. (2d) 138 (Ind. 1946).
9. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400
(1942); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1938); Hale v. Ken-
tucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Gibson v. Mis-
sissippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1881).
10. See n. 9 supra.
11. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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rive of law but also of the American standards of justice and equality.
Submitted, that the "judgment in this case was not prejudicial to the
petitioner since the trial court orally found that five members of
the jury did tend toward the laboring class. 1 2 The court appears to
be closing the door to a practice, which if not controlled, could serve
substantial injustice in future litigation.
TAXATION
EMBEZZLED FUNDS AS INCOME
Taxpayer, employed as a bookkeeper, embezzled over $12,000
during 1941. He was convicted in 1942, sentenced for the crime, and
paroled in 1943. The Commissioner determined that the taxpayer was
required to report the embezzled funds as income received in 1941 and
asserted a tax deficiency. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner1
and the circuit court of appeals reversed.2 Held: affirmed. The
embezzled money did not constitute income to the taxpayer in 1941
under Sec. 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. Commissioner
v. Wilcox, 66 Sup. Ct. 546 (1946).8
This decision holds that embezzled funds per so are not as a
matter of law taxable income,4 reversing the previous administrative
interpretation of Sec. 22 (a) 5 approved by the Tax Court.6  The
decision has been criticized as a departure from the previous approach
that illegal gains are taxable as a matter of public policy, that the
"test" proposed is irreconcilable with other decided cases, and that
the decision ignores the practical gains to the embezzler.7
Mr. Justice Burton took sharp issue with the majority opinion,
summing up his position as follows: "Because of the legislative his-
tory of See. 22 (a), the breadth of the language used by Congress in
that section, the attempt of Congress to use the full measure of its
12. Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not understand why the judgment
wasn't free from any inherent infirmity in that it was "too large
an assumption on which to base judicial action that those workers
who are paid by the day have a different outlook psychologically
than those who earn weekly wages .. ." Principal case at p. 990.
1. T.C. Memo. Dec., 3 C.C.H. 1944 Fed. Tax Serv. T.C. Dec. 14,107(M)
2. 148 F. (2d) 933 (C.C.A. 9th, 1945).
3. Dissenting opinion Burton, J., principal case at p. 550.
4. The Treasury Department's interpretation of the decision is as fol-
lows: "The mere act of embezzlement does not of itself result
in taxable income to the embezzler for federal income tax purposes.
If the owner condones the taking of the property and forgives
the indebtedness, taxable income may result to the embezzler, de-
pending on the facts in the particular case." 4 C.C.H. 1946 Fed.
Tax Serv. 6230,'G.C.M. 24945, 1946-13-12335.
5. G.C.M. 16572, XV-1 Cum. Bul. 82 (1936).
6. See Spruance, 43 B.T.A. 221 (1941), rev'd sub nom., McKnight v.
Comm'r, 127 F. (2d) 572 (C.A.A. 5th, 1942); Kurrle v. Comm'r, P.H.
1941 Fed. Tax Serv. B.T.A. Memo. Dec. 41,085, aff'd, 126 F. (2d)
723 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942).
7. (1946) 44 Mich. L. Rev. 885; (1946) 34 Calif. L. Rev. 449,
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